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Feminist Jurisprudence: Justice and Care 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The nature of law changes according to one's perspective of, or the 
way one views, the law. 1 Jurisprudence is a collection of those perspec-
tives, and includes many subcategories, including positivist jurispru-
dence, natural law, originalism, utilitarianism, and legal realism. 2 Juris-
prudential theory is important in order to have a viewpoint from which to 
examine cases and the law, and we submit that feminist theory provides 
fertile ground for examining and developing law under a practical juris-
prudence. 3 Feminist jurisprudence, if the number of books and arti 
1. According to the Heisenberg indeterminacy principle, we cannot observe both the 
location and the motion of sub-atomic particles at the same time. To observe one, is to change the 
other. We think this principle applies to other things as well; the observation of a phenomenon 
(such a social movement) will often cause that phenomenon itself to change. STEPHEN W. 
HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES 54-56 (1988). 
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (6th ed. 1991) defines "jurisprudence" as: "The 
philosophy of law, or the science which treats of the principles of positive law and legal relations." 
In short, jurisprudence looks at legal systems and how they function. Scales writes that in addition 
to looking at the structure of legal systems and valuing abstract principles such as neutrality, we 
need to do more when evaluating legal systems: 
A legal system must attempt to assure fairness. Fairness must have reference 
to real human predicaments. Abstract universality is a convenient device for some 
philosophical pursuits, or for any endeavor whose means can stand without ends, 
but it is only extrinsically important. Its actual value depends upon its success 
in promoting that which is intrinsically valuable. By inquiring into the mythic 
structure of objectivity, we see that abstract universality explicitly contradicts the 
ideal of a "government of laws, not men." Our task therefore, is to construct a 
system which avoids solipsism, which recognizes that the subjectivity of the law-
maker is not the whole of reality. 
Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1380 
(1986). 
3. As Cole notes, "social theorists need a method." David Cole, Getting There: Reflections 
on Trashing From Feminist Jurisprudence and Critical Theory, 8 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 59, 59 
(1985). Feminists are, without question, social theorists in the respect that they are deeply 
concerned with changing society. Cole defines method as "the bridge between theory and practice." 
/d. at 59, n. 3. It is one thing to develop a theory, but it is an entirely different proposition to turn 
that theory into practice. Scales writes: 
Law needs some theory of differentiation. Feminism, as a theory of 
differentiation, is particularly well suited to it. Feminism brings law back to its 
purpose--to decide the moral crux of the matter in real human situations. Law 
is a complex system of communication; its communicative matrix is intended to 
give access to the moral crux. Finding the crux depends upon the relation among 
things, not upon their opposition. In any case, imperfect analogies are available; 
a case is similar or dissimilar to others in an unlimited variety of ways. The 
scope and limits of any analogy must be explored in each case, with social reality 
as our guide. This is a normative, but not illogical process. Any logic is a norm, 
and cannot be used except with reference to its purposes. Why should that be so 
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cles on the subject are any indication,4 is a dynamic area of legal thought. 
But before one may define a "feminist" jurisprudence, one must first look 
to the meaning of feminism. 5 
A. A Brief History of Feminism 
It can be argued that feminism, in one form or another, existed even 
before the Golden Age of Greece. 6 Feminism and feminists today take 
many forms and are known by many labels: radical, or dominance femi-
nists; "pragmatic" feminists; essentialist feminists; formal equality femi-
nists; substantive equality feminists; nonsubordination feminists; domi-
nance theory feminists; different voice feminists; and non-essentialism 
feminists. More relevant to our consideration is the development of the 
feminist movement in Western culture and the particular forms of femi-
nism that are currently part of the feminist dialogue. 
The roots of modern feminism date from the French and American 
revolutions. From that time the question arose, "If men should be free, 
why not women too?" Mary Wollstonecraft wrote A Vindication of the 
Rights of Men during the French Revolution as a response to Edmund 
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, in which he attacked the 
revolution and its sympathizers? Her book was popular and successful 
until other works, such as Thomas Paine's The Rights of Men, supplanted 
its popularity. 8 Wollstonecraft also wrote A Vindication of the Rights of 
Women using the same type of reasoning she used in her first work. THE 
Rights of Women is a well-written treatise, but the book lost popularity 
hard to perceive, to teach, and to do? 
Scales, supra note 2, at 1387. 
4. In February 1997 a WES1LA W search among law reviews and other legal periodicals 
under the search terms feminist and jurisprttdence returned 3180 different citations. 
5. Many questions abound about how feminist ideas could or ought to address perceived 
flaws in the current legal system: 
Feminist legal scholars have devoted enormous energies to patching the cracks 
in the [legal system]. The debate has been and continues to be, arduous. Which 
differences between the sexes are or should be relevant for legal purposes? How 
does one tell what the differences are? Does it matter whether the differences are 
inherent or the result of upbringing? Is it enough to distinguish between accurate 
and inaccurate stereotyped differences? Or are there situations where differences 
are sufficiently "real" and permanent to demand social accommodation? 
Scales, supra note 3, at 1375. Even self-described feminists disagree about the exact definition of 
"feminism." We have attempted to use the term inclusively. See infra, note 11. 
6. See, E.g., ARISTOPHANES, LYSISTRATA (Donald Sutherland, trans., 1961) (The play's 
comedy turns on women's decision to abstain from social contacts with men so as to persuade the 
men to cease their warring ways.). 
7. 2 THE NORTON ANrHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 99 (M. H. Abrams et al. eds., 6th 
ed. 1993). 
8. !d. 
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after Wollstonecraft's death, when her well-meaning but naive husband 
exposed her unconventional way of life. 9 
John Stuart Mill, best known for his work on Benthamism and eco-
nomics, was another notable proponent of the female rights. Mill was the 
first to make a motion in the House of Commons for female suffrage, and 
he and/or his wife, Harriet Taylor, wrote the revolutionary work, The 
Subjugation of Women. 10 The strains of women's legal voice have risen in 
a steady crescendo ever since. 11 
B. Six Forms of Modern Feminism 
Feminism today may be classified into at least six separate schools of 
thought. The first type of feminism, formal equality, can be described as 
the principle of equal treatment: "individuals who are alike should be 
treated alike." Thus, men and women, as substantially alike individuals 
who differ biologically and perhaps psychologically, but not in any other 
substantial way "should have the exact same legal rights."12 Aristotle re-
ferred to this kind of equality, although only in relation to men. Scales 
writes, "In this country, the engine of the struggle for equality has been 
Aristotelian: Equality means to treat like persons alike, and unlike per-
sons unlike."13 The formal equality model of feminism is rapidly losing 
9. !d. at 101. 
10. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text 
11. As Cole notes: "The term 'feminism' encompasses a wide range of political and 
personal stances." Like Cole, 
[ w ]hen this Article uses the term broadly, it is not so much to describe a 
particular substantive content as to locate a perspective in the social 
spectrum .... In this broad sense, "feminist" refers to any claim that articulates 
a position related to women or "the feminine," ... and that substantively affirms 
women's right to equality .... [i]t is not to suggest that feminism is monolithic, 
but only that various feminisrns share certain generalizable attributes and 
perspectives that afford insights into self-reflection." 
Cole, supra note 3, at 59, n. 82. We also recognize that not all feminists are women nor are all 
women feminists. As MacKinnon notes: "Male is a social and political concept, not a biological 
attribute. As I use it, it has nothing whatever to do with inherency, preexistence, nature, 
inevitability, or body as such." Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: 
ToY.oard Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 636 n.3 (1983) (emphasis in original). If we do not 
define "male" and "female" strictly along sexual lines, the reader may wonder why we bother to 
differentiate between the two views at all. Gilligan gives one explanation: 
Nancy Chodorow, attempting to account for "the reproduction within each 
generation of certain general and nearly universal differences that characterize 
masculine and feminine personality and roles," attributes these differences 
between the sexes not to anatomy but rather to "the fact that women, universally, 
are largely responsible for early child care." 
CAROL Gll.UGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 7 (1982) quoting Nancy Chodorow, Family Structure and 
Feminine Personality, WOMAN, CULTURE AND SociETY (M.Z. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere, eds., 1974). 
12. KATHARINE T. BARTIEIT, ET Al, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 
71 (1993). 
13. Scales, supra note 2, at 1374 (footnote omitted). 
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popularity because it does not adequately deal with gender differences; 
nonetheless, this early brand of feminist reasoning has led to greater 
women's suffrage, increased equal protection of the law, and equal pay. 
Second, the substantive equality form of feminism looks at the results 
or effects of a rule or law. 14 Substantive equality demands "that rules take 
account of these differences to avoid unfair, gender-related outcomes."15 
"The test in any challenge should be 'whether the policy or practice in 
question integrally contributes to the maintenance of an underclass or a 
deprived position because of gender status.' "16 Substantive equality has 
focused on such things as maternity leave provisions and child care assis-
tance, but has also addressed such issues as affirmative action and other 
gender-specific benefits to remedy past societal discrimination. 17 As 
Scales notes, "the 'relevant' differences have been and always will be 
those which keep women in their place."18 
Third, nonsubordination or dominance theory focuses on the "imbal-
ance of power between women and men."19 This theory primarily 
addresses the issue of "whether a rule or practice serves to subordinate 
women to men. "20 The dominance theory focuses on issues such as sexual 
harassment of women, marital rape, domestic violence, and the battered 
women syndrome. 
Fourth, the autonomy theory of feminism argues "that women should 
have greater personal autonomy, freedom to make their own choices, and 
power to control their own lives."21 
A fifth type of feminist theory is non-essentialism, which deals with 
the problem of over generalization, or the stereotyping of members of a 
particular group. 22 According to Bartlett, non-essentialism's primary fo-
cus is on "the implied attribution to all women of the traits of those who 
are white, middle class, heterosexual, able-bodied, and otherwise privi-
14. Scales writes: 
In the past, biological differences have been used to show that classifications are 
not sex-based. Thereby, the reasons for having antidiscrimination laws have been 
seen as the reasons to allow discrimination. . . . The issue is not freedom to be 
treated without regard to sex; the issue is freedom from systematic subordination 
because of sex. 
!d. at 1394. 
15. BARTLETT, supra note 12, at 249. 
16. Scales, supra note 2, at 1394 (footnotes omitted). Scales borrows this question from 
Catharine MacKinnon. 
17. BARTLETT, supra note 12, at 249. 
18. Scales, supra note 2, at 1378 (footnote omitted). 
19. BARTLETT, supra note 12, at 413. 
20. ld. 
21. !d. at 671. 
22. ld. at 871. 
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leged. "23 Non-essentialists believe that the differences between individual 
women need to be more fully taken into account. 
Finally, the feminine or different voice(s) theory looks at "women's 
differences ... less as problems to be addressed than as potentially valu-
able resources that might serve as a better model of social organization 
and law than existing 'male' characteristics and values."24 
Although each form of feminism has much to offer (and there is some 
overlap among them), this paper deals primarily with different voice the-
ory. Different voice theory lends itself particularly well to the develop-
ment of a fair and practical jurisprudence, and we hope to demonstrate 
that a workable jurisprudential model may be drawn from the best ele-
ments of both "female" and "male" legal perspectives without ignoring 
the contributions of men or by making women into helpless victims and 
ignoring autonomy. The question, therefore, is not which gender is 
right-but what is fair for both sexes in achieving "justice." 
C. The Different Voice 
Baier writes: 
It is clear, I think, that the best moral theory has to be a coopera-
tive product of women and men, has to harmonize justice and 
care. The morality it theorizes about is after all for all persons, 
for men and for women, and will need their combined 
insights .... what we need now is a "marriage" of the old male 
and the newly articulated femaie insights. 25 
The model for feminine jurisprudence is not necessarily based upon 
uniquely female characteristics. While many of the characteristics of fem-
inine jurisprudence are not gender-specific, they are perhaps most often 
and most easily traced through the feminine experience. Thus, instead of 
looking at the concept of a "feminine" jurisprudence as a pure gender 
issue, it is useful to consider the different voice as 
characterized not by gender but by theme. Its association with 
women is an empirical observation, and it is primarily through 
women's voices that [one may] trace its development. But this 
association is not absolute, and the contrasts between male and 
female voices . . . highlight a distinction between two modes of 
23. /d. 
24. Id, at 589. 
25. Annette C. Baier, The Need for More than Justice, JUSTICE AND CARE: EsSENTIAL 
READINGS IN FEMINIST ETHICS 47, 57 (Virginia Held ed., 1995). 
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thought and . . . focus on a problem of interpretation rather than 
[a representation or] generalization about either sex. 26 
Obviously there are inherent differences between men and women 
But it is often difficult to say "different" without making a value judge-
ment. By some feminists' definition, maleness or femaleness is not in 
itself biologically defined, but socially determined. As one feminist uses 
the terminology, for instance, "maleness" is "more epistemological than 
ontological, undercutting the distinction itself, given male power to con-
form being with perspective ... :m In this view, the "female" or the 
"male" voice is not an inborn trait that accompanies either an X or a Y 
chromosome. Each voice can be found in every person, and the discovery 
of that voice is dependent upon the person's individual experience and 
the social milieu in which the individual spends his or her formative 
years. "The perspective from the male standpoint is not always each 
man's opinion, although most men adhere to it, nonconsciously and with-
out considering it a point of view, as much because it makes sense of 
their experience (the male experience) as because it is in their interest."28 
The male voice is the male voice because it makes sense of the male ex-
perience. Similarly, the female voice-a voice different from the voice 
heard so loudly for centuries-is the female voice because it makes sense 
of the female experience. 
I. A Caring Judicial System 
The idea of a judicial system based on care, rather than on rules, 
draws heavily from the work of noted psychologist Carol Gilligan. 
Gilligan's research is based on observations of children, and those obser-
vations have been extrapolated to include adults' actions as well: 
In a study on sex differences on the games that children play 
done on elementary-school-aged children, it was found that "boys 
play out of doors more often than girls do; boys play more often 
in large and age-heterogenous groups than girls; they play com-
petitive games more often, and their games last longer than girls' 
games."29 
The last finding is interesting because it demonstrates that 
26. GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 2. 
27. MacKinnon, supra note 11, at 636, n.3. 
28. ld. 
29. GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 4 (quoting Janet Lever, Sex Differences in the Games 
Children Play, 23 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 478-487 (1976)). 
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[b]oys' games appeared to last longer not only because they re-
quired a higher degree of skill and were thus less likely to 
become boring, but also because, when disputes arose in the 
course of a game, boys were able to resolve the disputes more 
effectively than girls .... In fact, it seemed that the boys enjoyed 
the legal debates as much as they did the game itself. 30 
261 
Perhaps then, the traditionally male-dominated legal profession, which is 
by nature a dispute-resolving discipline, became male-dominated out of 
primitive man's ability to effectively resolve the earliest playground dis-
putes over the last drumstick from Tyrannosaurus Rex. 
But while males seem to demonstrate a talent for confrontation and 
debate, girls, as Gilligan observed, tend to be more pragmatic toward the 
rules of the game.31 For while males tend throughout childhood to 
become "increasingly fascinated with legal elaboration of rules and the 
development of fair procedures for adjudicating conflicts, [that fascina-
tionj does not hold for girls."32 Girls regarded rules as good as long as the 
rule compensated completely for any harm that may have been done by 
the rule's violation. Generally, the girls observed were more tolerant 
about violations of the rules, more willing to make exceptions, more eas-
ily reconciled to changes in the game, and more likely to resolve conflicts 
creatively. 33 Gilligan's thesis is that care and relationships are largely 
overlooked by the judicial system's current methods of analyzing moral 
dilemmas. But "while they are used by both men and women, women fo-
cus on care and relationships considerably more than men do."34 
2. Adapting 
Considering the playground of contemporary society, in which the 
rules of the game have been drawn and are strictly enforced primarily by 
males, "if a girl does not want to be left dependent on men, she will have 
to learn to play like a boy."35 Very often, learning "to play like a boy" 
requires a woman to subvert, or at least stifle, her feminine voice in order 
to make it in a man's world. Generally when the law deals with a para-
30. !d. at 9. 
31. !d. at 10. Lever points out that "girls are more tolerant in their attitudes toward rules, 
more willing to make exceptions, and more easily reconciled to innovations. As a result, the legal 
sense ... 'is far Jess developed in little girls than in boys.'" !d. (citations omitted). 
32. !d. at 10. 
33. !d. 
34. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 
34-35 (1988). 
35. GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 10. 
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dox, it deals with it by suppressing the disruptive term. 36 The law does 
not favor nonconformity. The principle of civil disobedience is evidence 
of, and is in fact based upon the law's distaste for nonconformity. For 
someone to approach the law with the attitude of being more tolerant, 
willing to make more exceptions, and more easily reconciled to innova-
tions-that is, with a different, or feminine voice, history has shown that 
often the nonconforming attitude will be met with disdain, indifference, 
or even contempt: 
With respect to many gender-related issues, the law ignores 
woman's perspective and treats man's perspective as objective 
truth. It strives to impose order on a disordered world by incorpo-
rating difference (women, Blacks, gays, the poor) through assimi-
lation, or denying difference through exclusion. In law, one side 
must win .... It requires the drawing of lines between that which 
is "inside," or legitimate, and that which is "outside," or illegal. 
Historically, heterosexual white men have drawn those lines. 
Thus, the legal perspective, despite its facade of neutrality and 
objectivity, is defined by the male perspective. 37 
Traditional legal theory does not allow for many grey areas. It is obvious 
that the values of women and men differ. A day in the life of a married 
couple will attest to that fact. So it is in society, where very often those 
values have been codified into law. Yet, "it is the masculine values that 
prevail."38 Very often male behavior is regarded as the norm and female 
behavior as some deviation from that norm. 39 And like the boys playing 
games on the playground, application of these masculine values requires 
that all cases have a winner and a loser. 
Even so, society is gradually getting away from the "winner-loser" 
mind set with the growing popularity of alternative dispute resolution and 
other "win-win" negotiative processes. It seems logical that other 
contextual-based and discretionary options could also be integrated into 
current legal framework. Over a century ago the value of a discretionary 
voice in the courtroom was known. As Matthew Carpenter, addressing 
the United States Supreme Court, put it, while some cases may require 
"rough qualities possessed by men, ... [t]here are many causes in which 
36. See Cole, supra note 3, at 83. 
37. !d. (citations omitted). 
38. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 76 (1929) (quoted irt GILLIGAN, supra note 
11,at16). 
39. GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 14 (citing DAVID MCCLELLAND, POWER: THE INNER 
EXPERIENCE 81 (1975)). 
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the silver voice of woman would accomplish more than the severity and 
sternness of man could achieve. "40 Whereas in traditional jurisprudence 
women's issues are seen often as problems that need to be addressed, 
feminist jurisprudence sees gender differences "as potentially valuable 
resources that might serve as a better model of social organization and 
Jaw than existing 'male' characteristics and values."41 
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
In the first section of the paper we defined jurisprudence and several 
types of feminism. In this section we discuss why more traditional forms 
of jurisprudence are not entirely satisfactory. We are not claiming that 
feminist jurisprudence is the ultimate solution to all of society's prob-
lems, but incorporation of a feminine voice into the chorus of legal 
thought may provide a fresh perspective in solving some of traditional 
legal theory's problems. 
A. Male Bias and Female Invisibility 
Scales writes that "[t]he term 'feminist jurisprudence' disturbs peo-
ple. That is not surprising, given patriarchy's convenient habit of labeling 
as unreliable any approach that admits to be interested, and particularly 
given the historic a priori invalidation of women's experience."42 "Thus, 
the legal perspective, despite its facade of neutrality and objectivity, is 
defined by the male perspective. The law, moreover, carries the authority 
of the state, and it is thereby empowered to make man's point of view a 
reality."43 However, as feminists and post-modernists agree, there is no 
objective position from which we can view life. We cannot not directly 
interact with life, a text, or a case. We are always interpreting the envi-
ronmental stimuli we deal with; however, in making our interpretations 
we are constrained by the community and culture in which we live. By 
that we mean that there is no such thing as "objective meaning." Yet, nei-
ther is meaning itself completely subjective. We live in a historical, com-
munal, and cultural structure that constrains meaning in certain ways. All 
approaches are interested and biased to some extent-if for no other rea-
son than the time in which we live and the assumptions we grow up with. 
Any system that ignores the perspective of an entire class or entire classes 
of people is at best unfair, and at worst, perilous. Even with the system's 
40. Matthew Carpenter, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, at 137 (1872). 
41. BARTLETT, supra note 12, at 589. 
42. Scales, supra note 2, at 1399. 
43. Cole, supra note 3, at 83-84. 
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claim of neutrality and objectivity, it strains to "hear" the different voice 
with its somewhat limited hearing. Robin West adds: 
By the claim that modern jurisprudence is "masculine," I mean 
two things. First I mean that the values [and] the dangers that 
characterize women's lives are not reflected at any level whatso-
ever in contracts, torts, constitutional law, or any other field of 
legal doctrine. The values that flow from women's material po-
tential for physical connection are not recognized as values by 
the Rule of Law, and the dangers attendant to that state are not 
recognized as dangers by the Rule of Law.44 
Often male-based systems deal in dichotomies, such as male/female, 
good/bad, right/wrong, but life rarely breaks down into such neat catego-
ries. Cole explains how this tendency works in society: "[o]ur culture de-
nies the feminine an independent voice and defines the feminine as other 
to man's one, as object to man's subject. "45 Society's definition is prob-
lematic, because when faced with two choices, one choice tends to be 
labeled "good" while the other is labeled "bad." 
[S]ex role turns out to be one of the most important determinants 
of human behavior; psychologists have found sex differences in 
their studies from the moment they started doing empirical re-
search. But since it is difficult to say "different" without saying 
"better" or "worse," since there is a tendency to construct a sin-
gle scale of measurement, and since that scale has generally been 
derived from and standardized on the basis of men's interpreta-
tions of research data drawn predominantly or exclusively from 
studies of males, psychologists "have tended to regard male be-
havior as the 'norm' and female behavior as some kind of devia-
tion from that norm. "46 
Law is particularly susceptible to this polarized way of thinking: 
In the past, two legal choices appeared to resolve claims of social 
injustice: Law could either ignore differences, thereby risking 
needless conformity, or it could freeze differences, thereby creat-
ing a menu of justifications for inequality. Concrete universality 
44. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
45. Cole, supra note 3, at 79-80. 
46. GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 14, quoting DAVID MCCLELI.AND, POWER: THE INNER 
EXPERffiNCE 81 (1975). 
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eliminates the need for such a choice. When our priority is to un-
derstand differences and to value multiplicity, we need only to 
discern between occasions of respect and occasions of oppres-
sion. Those are judgments we know how to make, even without a 
four-part test to tell us, for every future circumstance, what con-
stitutes domination. 47 
265 
Perhaps the law is so susceptible to polarized thinking because it is used 
to operating with two adversarial parties. One of the things feminists do, 
is to try to escape dichotomies and to see that there are a whole range of 
choices between the extremes available; this also allows the labels of 
"good" and "bad" to slip away, and also permits other implications of a 
case to be more fully considered, such as how the case will affect society 
as a whole, and how great are the needs of the parties and their families in 
the long run. Perhaps law's polarized vision explains why it is a "truism 
that hard cases make bad law."48 Justices have wanted to do the right 
thing, but have not been able to see all the choices open to them. 
B. Justice Without Care Leads to Unhappiness 
The story of the life of John Stuart Mill is illustrative of the difficul-
ties with focusing on justice to the exclusion of other feelings and consid-
erations. Mill was "deliberately trained by his father [to become] the 
leader of the Utilitarians" after the death of Bentham. 49 When Mill was 
about twenty, he faced "a great crisis in his mental development-the 
kind of self-searching forty-days-in-the-wilderness ... that so many other 
Victorians underwent."50 Today, we would probably refer to his experi-
ence as a major depression. 51 "His Benthamistic desire to reform the 
world no longer seemed to him sufficient cause for living."52 Justice 
alone no longer satisfied him, and he was, in fact, profoundly unhappy. 
Mill overcame his crisis, or depression, through reading Wordsworth, 
Coleridge, Goethe, and Carlyle, and concluding that "although Bentham-
ism rightly regarded happiness as the end of life, a person can attain hap-
47. Scales, supra note 2, at 1388. 
48. Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm., 502 U.S. 197, 207 (1991) (O'Connor, 
J., dissenting). 
49. John W. Bowyer & John L. Brooks, Introduction to John Stuart Miil, THE VICTORIAN 
AGE 239 (2nd ed. 1954). 
50. !d. at 240. 
51. See NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note 7, at 993. Mill's condition is referred to as a 
"nervous breakdown," and since this term has next to no legal or medical significance, we have 
chosen to use the term "depression." 
52. THE VICTORIAN AGE, supra note 50, at 240. Suicidal ideation is a classic sign of 
depression. 
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piness only by seeking such an unselfish end as the happiness of 
others."53 In other words, Mill realized that what is today known as the 
ethic of care was just as important as the ethic of justice. Or put another 
way, multiple viewpoints are not only helpful but healthy. Others have 
noticed that the law's exclusive focus on justice causes unhappiness for 
others. 
For the main complaint about the Kantian version of a society 
with its first virtue justice, construed as respect for equal right to 
formal goods such as having contracts kept, due process, equal 
opportunity including opportunity to participate in political activ-
ities leading to policy and law-making, to basic liberties of 
speech, free association and assembly, religious worship, is that 
none of these goods do much to ensure that the people who have 
them and mutually respect such rights will have any other rela-
tionships to one another than the minimal relationship needed to 
keep such a 'civil society' going. They may well be lonely, 
driven to suicide, apathetic about their work and about participa-
tion in political processes, find their lives meaningless and have 
no wish to leave offspring to face the same meaningless 
existence. Their rights, and respect for rights, are quite compati-
ble with very great misery, and misery whose causes are not just 
individual misfortunes and psychic sickness, but social and moral 
impoverishment. 54 
This malaise affects women more than it affects men. Cole points out that 
"[o]ne cannot speak as a feminist in a social culture that defines feminine 
as silent without some measure of affirmative self-reflection .... For a 
woman to be unreflective in man's world is to be objectified, silenced, 
and pacified-to be rendered an object."55 And those women who realize 
that they have been rendered an object experience feelings of frustration, 
depression, and powerlessness. Only by adding the feminine voice to the 
already existing voice, can we hope to achieve what Bentham and Mill 
hoped to achieve: the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Some 
would argue that the male voice needs to be silenced in order to hear the 
53. Id. 
54. Baier, supra note 25, at 51. See also, Robert Wright, The Evolution of Despair, TIME, 
Aug. 28, 1995, at 50 (discussing the theories of evolutionary psychologists who argue that our 
psyches are unsuited to live in the modern world, and that humans have become incTeasingly 
depressed because of growing isolation from one another). 
55. Cole, supra note 3, at 81. 
' 
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feminine voice. Others seek a greater blend of voices, hoping to change 
what sounds like a solo into a harmonious duet. 
It is not only in legal circles that people have become concerned 
about what happens to people when they concentrate solely on justice. 
Baier writes that recently in moral and social philosophy, while not deny-
ing the importance of justice, people are nevertheless "challenging the 
assumed supremacy of justice among the moral and social virtues."56 She 
notes that the challenge is surprising because many who are challenging 
the supremacy of justice are those who have historically been denied it. 
She writes: 
Those who have only recently won recognition of their equal 
rights, who have only recently seen the correction or partial cor-
rection of longstanding racist and sexist injustices to their race 
and sex, are among the philosophers now suggesting that justice 
is only one virtue among many, and one that may need the pres-
ence of the others in order to deliver its own undenied value. "57 
She also notes that many such philosophers have been influenced by 
Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice. 58 Perhaps these philosophers, while 
marginalized, have learned to value what we might term the "feminine" 
and they have realized that while they have achieved much by gaining 
access to "justice," they also risk losing part of their voice if they give up 
the values they previously held. 59 
Scales describes her vision of life without the ethic of care in the fol-
lowing quotation; she also points out the problem inherent in taking the 
ethic of care too far: 
The rights-based side of things, for all its grand abstraction, de-
scribes a pretty grim view of life on the planet. It treats individu-
als in society as isolated monads, as natural adversaries who must 
each stake out his own territory and protect it with the 
sword/shield mechanisms called 'rights.' This model of aggres-
sion is half of what is required for holocaust. False glorification 
of the "care-based" ethic supplies the other side of the suicidal 
equation, because a death march requires willing-looking victims. 
The incorporationist version of the care-based ethic celebrates 
oblivion. Its Disney-movie appeal diverts attention from the issue 
56. Baier, supra note 25, at 47. 
57. !d. 
58. !d. 
59. See the discussion infra of Bender's tort students text part IV. 
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of powerlessness, and, indeed, makes a political virtue of it. Mas-
ters glorify the contentment of their slaves, empires of their colo-
nies. Here, hegemony strikes again. An incorporationist legal re-
gime would, at best, merely institutionalize a familiar female 
critique-steady but ineffectual. 60 
The problems with a feminist-based jurisprudence will be discussed fur-
ther in section IV. 
C. Another Problem-The System Is Not Working 
Another problem with the traditional system of justice is that family 
law issues often receive short shrift-they are not dealt with as the seri-
ous and far-reaching issues they are. For example, until 1992 Utah had 
yet to do away with the marital rape exemption. That is, one spouse could 
not successfully charge the other spouse with rape. One reason for the 
delay could very well have been the preponderance of male judges and 
attorneys who form and interpret the state's laws. 
The first Menendez brothers trial and the OJ. Simpson criminal trial 
showed us that something is seriously amiss in the United States criminal 
trial system. The United States civil trial system is not without its prob-
lems, either. The recent brouhaha surrounding a multimillion dollar jury 
verdict for spilled coffee shows that some tort awards are completely out 
of proportion to the damage suffered. Ideally, the American legal system 
operates upon the notion that justice is "blind," and that all are equal be-
fore the bench. The notion operates differently, however, in practice. In 
many cases the rich and the white get a different brand of justice than the 
poor and the black 61 These are all problems that need to be dealt with 
soon by the legal profession or the legislative branch will make its own 
changes. 
D. Feminist Jurisprudence is Threatening 
Many people are afraid that if we incorporate a feminist justice of 
care into our legal system the result will be anarchy, or at least a reduc-
tion of legal stability. The choice, however, is not between the status quo 
and no law at all. Our responsibility is to improve the law and make it 
more responsive to all citizens. American jurisprudence is a constantly 
60. Scales, supra note 2, at 1391-92 (footnote omitted). 
61. As an illustration, take the factually similar and contemporaneous cases involving 
political scion William Kennedy Smith, who is white, and professional boxing champion Mike 
Tyson, who is black. Both men were accused of rape. Both men asserted the defense that the 
women "meant yes, even while crying no." Smith was acquitted. Tyson was convicted. 
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growing, constantly developing, very much alive creature. By its very 
nature it must change and adapt to its surroundings. Utter rejection of the 
status quo is not necessary-merely a channeling of the direction of juris-
prudential change. Just as Audre Lourde states that we can never disman-
tle the master's house with the master's tools/2 neither can we dismantle 
the house of justice without tools. What is needed is new tools to repair 
and perhaps remodel the house of justice. 63 
Baier writes: 
The most obvious point is the challenge to the individualism of 
the Western tradition, to the fairly entrenched belief in the possi-
bility and desirability of each person pursuing his own good in 
his own way, constrained only by a minimal formal common 
good namely a working legal apparatus that enforces contracts 
and protects individuals from undue interference by others. 
Gilligan reminds us that noninterference can, especially for the 
relatively powerless, such as the very young, amount to neglect, 
and even between equals can be isolating and alienating. 64 
And Baier adds: 
Traces of the old patriarchal poison still remain in even the best 
contemporary moral theorizing. Few may actually say that 
women's place is in the home, but there is much muttering, when 
unemployment figures rise, about how the relatively recent flood 
of women into the work force complicates the problem, as if it 
would be a good thing if women just went back home whenever 
unemployment rises, to leave the available jobs for the men. We 
still do not really have a wide acceptance of the equal right of 
women to employment outside the home. Nor do we have wide 
acceptance of the equal duty of men to perform those domestic 
tasks which in no way depend on female anatomy, namely cook-
ing, cleaning, and the care of weaned children. 65 
We need to find a way of incorporating individual rights with caring rela-
tionships and realize that not all are equal-whether or not the law states 
that we are created as equals. The law already treats children and the 
62. AUDRE LOURDE, SISTER OUTSIDER, 110, 111 (1984). 
63. See Cheryl B. Preston, This Old House: A Blueprint for Constructive Feminism, 83 
GEO. L.J. 2271 (1995). 
64. Baier, supra note 25, at 52. 
65. !d. at 54. 
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mentally incompetent differently, we need to allow for other differences 
and varied life situations. Justice should be the right of every man and 
woman-not just the privileged. 
Ill. TowARD A FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 
As Cornell writes, "[fjeminists, for all of the divergence among them, 
continue to join in a united call for justice for women. "66 Mill was an ac-
tive proponent of women's rights, possibly in part because of the change 
in his value system. "In 1866 Mill made the tirst motion in the House of 
Commons for woman suffrage."67 "In 1869 Mill said that he regarded the 
emancipation of women and co-operative production as the two great 
changes necessary to the regeneration of society. We of course agree that 
the greater cooperation of women and men could change society and is a 
goal worth pursuing. Mill published THE SUBJUGATION OF WOMEN in 
1869. It is an excellent statement of the feminist arguments based on tra-
ditional, or male biased legal philosophy."68 Mill's work represents a con-
tinuing tradition as feminists continue to work for equality. 
66. Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the limit: Systems Theory a11d Feminist Legal 
Refonn, DECONSTRUCI'ION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 68 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992). 
67. THE VICTORIAN AGE, supra note 50, at 241. The fact that a man, who wa~ a member 
of the House of Commons had to propose extending the vote to women illustrates Baier's point 
that 
Rights have usually been for the privileged. Talking about laws, and the rights 
those Ia ws recognize and protect, does not in itself ensure that the group of 
legislators and rights-holders will not be restricted to some elite. Bills of right~ 
have usually been proclamations of the right of some in-group, barons, land-
owners, males, whites, non-foreigners. The "justice perspective," and the legal 
sense that goes with it, are shadowed by their patriarchal past. 
Baier, supra note 25, at 53. Howe.ver, as Baier also notes, the "privileged" have used the existing 
legal system to expand society's concept of rights and to expand the types of people entitled to 
protection of their rights. Mill and Wollstonecraft are two examples; the problem is, however, that 
this approach can only go so far. 
I d. 
It is however also true that the moral theories that made the concept of a 
person's right central were not just the instrument~ for excluding some persons, 
but also the instruments used by those who demanded that more and more 
persons be included in the favored group. Abolitionists, reformers, women, used 
the language of rights to assert their claims to inclusion in the group of full 
members of a community. The tradition of liberal moral theory has in fact 
developed so as to include the women it had for so long excluded, to include the 
poor as well as rich, blacks and whites, and so on. Women like Mary 
W ollstonecraft used the male moral theories to good purpose. So we should not 
he wholly ungrateful for those male moral theories, for all their objectionable 
earlier content. They were undoubtedly patriarchal, but they also contained the 
seeds of the challenge, or antidote, to this patriarchal poison. 
68. THE VICTORIAN AGE, supra note 49, at 242. We realize that Mill's wife, Harriet Taylor, 
may have written or co-written the article; even if this is so, Mill nonetheless permitted or insisted 
that the article be published under his name. 
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The lack of equality, and what to do about it, continues to be a prob-
lem in our society. However, feminists provide a unique perspective: 
"Grounded in experience whose validity society has denied, a feminist is 
less likely to be deluded into believing that we can unproblematically 
think our way out."69 Because of this perspective, women seek a variety 
of possible solutions instead of seeing problems as "either/or" proposi-
tions. "Within the 'different voice' theory, women's differences are view-
ed less as problems to be addressed than as potentially valuable resources 
that might serve as a better model of social organization and law than ex-
isting 'male' characteristics and values."70 "Because the feminist in a 
male society lives a paradoxical existence, she is able to pursue and re-
veal the latent contradictions in 'objective' social constructs.'m Relation-
ships and the exercise of power are also important to feminists. Baier 
writes: 
Relationships between those who are clearly unequal in power, 
such as parents and children, earlier and later generations in rela-
tion to one another, states and citizens, doctors and patients, the 
well and the ill, large states and small states, have had to be 
shunted to the bottom of the agenda, and then dealt with by some 
sort of "promotion" of the weaker so that an appearance of vir-
tual equality is achieved. Citizens collectively become equal to 
states, children are treated as adults-to-be, the ill and dying are 
treated as continuers of their earlier more potent selves, so that 
their "rights" could be seen as the rights of equals. This pretense 
of an equality that is in fact absent may often lead to desirable 
protection of the weaker, or more dependent. But it somewhat 
masks the question of what our moral relationships are to those 
who are our superiors or our inferiors in power. A more realistic 
acceptance of the fact that we begin as helpless children, that at 
almost every point of our lives we deal with both the more and 
the less helpless, that equality of power and interdependency, 
between two persons or groups, is rare and hard to recognize 
when it does occur, might lead us to a more direct approach to 
questions concerning the design of institutions structuring these 
relationships between unequals (families, schools, hospitals, ar-
mies) and of the morality of our dealings with the more and the 
less powerful. 72 
69. Cole, supra note 3, at 82. 
70. BARTLETI, supra note 12, at 589. 
71. Cole, supra note 3, at 62. 
72. Baier, supra note 25, at 55 (emphasis in original). 
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Obviously we cannot treat everyone as though they were equal in terms 
of needs and individual capacity; an infant and the President of the 
United States, for example, have little in common. The concept of differ-
ing power and need for care is suggested by the riddle of the sphinx}3 
Obviously someone who walks on four, then two, then three legs during 
the course of his life is not always as "equal" as they might be at another 
point in his life. A key question is: what are our moral relationships and 
obligations to others? 
A. Relationships and Obligations 
Perhaps the answer is the "caring neighbor" standard; perhaps it is 
something else that needs still to be developed. But whatever the standard 
is or ought to be, no one has yet found a satisfactory answer. Feminists 
are in a unique position to help develop a better resolution of the problem 
with the sounding of their "different voice." 
Baier pens: 
Women's traditional work, of caring for the less powerful, espe-
cially for the young, is obviously socially vital. One cannot re-
gard any version of morality that does not ensure that it gets well 
done as an adequate "minimal morality," any more than we could 
so regard one that left and concern for more distant future gener-
ations an optional extra.74 
When politicians speak of family values is this not what they mean, that 
future generations will have the love and benefits that past generations 
have enjoyed? Many are willing to argue that single parent families are 
the single largest cause of the breakdown of society; does it not make 
sense then, that we must all worry about future generations? Baier contin-
ues: 
Vulnerable future generations do not choose their dependence on 
earlier generations. The unequal infant does not choose its place 
in a family or nation, nor is it treated as free to do as it likes until 
some association is freely entered into. Nor do its parents always 
choose their parental role, or freely assume their parental respon-
sibilities any more than we choose our power to affect the condi-
tions in which later generations will live. 75 
73. See SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS THE KING (David Grene & Richard Lattimore, eds., 1954). 
74. Baier, supra note 25, at 55. 
75. ld. at 56. 
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We need to recognize that we all have obligations. There are always bur-
dens to go with benefits, and to simply stress the ethic of rights is to 
lie-for to be part of a community is to accept the responsibilities that go 
with it. These responsibilities, to be truly effective, must be freely chosen 
and self-enforced: 
The emphasis on care goes with a recognition of the often 
unchosen nature of the responsibilities of those who give care, 
both of children who care for their aged or infirm parents, and of 
parents who care for the children they in fact have. Contract soon 
ceases to seem the paradigm source of moral obligation once we 
attend to parental responsibility, and justice as a virtue of social 
institutions will come to seem at best only first equal with the 
virtue, whatever its name, that ensures that each new generation 
is made appropriately welcome and prepared for their adult 
lives. 76 
So what is this ethic of care that we have been talking about? Baier 
defines care as "a felt concern for the good of others and for community 
with them. The 'cold jealous virtue of justice' (Hume) is found to be too 
cold, and it is 'warmer' more communitarian virtues and social ideals that 
are being called into supplement it.'m Notice that Baier uses the word 
"supplement" not "replace." There are good things about our legal sys-
tem; there is no need to throw out the baby with the bathwater, but occa-
sionally, the water does need to be changed. 
We are most interested in what feminism can add, not with destroy-
ing the system. Although justice and care seem to be somewhat gender 
linked, they are not necessarily so, and anyone can be a proponent of ei-
ther, or both. Scales has been profoundly influenced by Carol Gilligan's 
book, In a Different Voice. She writes that Gilligan equates the develop-
ment of an "ethic of rights" or an "ethic of justice" with boys and the de-
velopment of an "ethic of care" or a focus on equity with girls.78 Males 
76. !d. 
77. !d. at 48. 
78. Scales, supra note 2, at 1380-81. Of course, assigning justice to boys and care to girls 
is a generalization and neither Scales nor Gilligan goes so far as to say that the development of 
these perspectives are strictly gender based. The broad assertion nonetheless tends to hold up. 
Although, most women can deal with either ethic, fewer men develop the "ethic of care." So, 
gender does seem to be a relevant factor. "Gilligan asserts that as a matter of personal moral 
development, the ability to integrate the ethics of care with the ethics of rights signals maturity." 
/d. at 1381 (footnote omitted). 
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tend to focus on autonomy, or "the separation between self and others" 
while females "perceive[] relationship[s] as constitutive of the self. "79 
Paradigmatic male values, like objectivity, are defined as exclu-
sive, identified by their presumed opposites. Those values cannot 
be content with multiplicity; they create the other and then de-
vour it. Objectivity ignores context; reason is the opposite of 
emotion; rights precluded care. As long as the ruling ideology is 
a function of this dichotomization, incorporationism threatens to 
be mere co-optation, a more subtle version of female invisibil-
ity. 80 
Scales adds, "Feminism does not claim to be objective, because objectiv-
ity is the basis for inequality. Feminism is not abstract, because abstrac-
tion when institutionalized shields the status quo from critique. Feminism 
is result-oriented. It is vitally concerned with the oblivion fostered by law-
yers' belief that process is what matters."81 A fundamental tenet of femi-
nist jurisprudence clearly identifies the first idea with how women tend to 
be socialized and the second idea with how men tend to be socialized. 
However, this socialization is most likely a remnant of ancient society 
rather than a notion hardwired into our brains. We can all learn to value 
the viewpoint of the other-if we are willing. "It is in the perspective of 
the other that we begin to see ourselves."82 
B. Consciousness Raising 
One of the ways that we can learn to understand the perspective of 
the other is through consciousness raising. Consciousness raising is more 
than a bunch of discontented women sitting around complaining about 
men; it is the opportunity to exchange stories and to explain how certain 
events in our lives make us feel. "Consciousness raising assures women 
that their point of view, which male culture has historically repressed and 
devalued, can be resurrected. It puts women in touch with a world that 
men have declared untouchable, and exposes the male ideology that mas-
querades as objectivity."83 Not only does consciousness raising affirm a 
woman's perspective, it is a way for women or men to examine their be-
liefs about the world and think about how their actions may affect others. 
"Consciousness raising requires vigilant self-reflection on the social 
79. ld. at 1382-83 (footnotes omitted). 
80. Id. at 1383. 
81. Jd. at 1385. 
82. Cole, supra note 3, at 91. 
83. !d. at 62. 
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meaning of being a woman in a man's world. Self-reflection, for femi-
nists as well as for any other marginalized group, is not so much a choice 
as a way of being."84 "Therefore, consciousness raising takes us beyond 
indeterminate subjectivity towards social consensus. It is through the 
method of consciousness raising that feminism's negative critique [of the 
legal system] becomes transformative.''85 The negative critique becomes 
transformative because it does more than simply criticize, it gains insight 
and identifies weaknesses. Seeing the legal system for what it is, will al-
lmv us to fortify the weak parts without impairing the foundation. 
The substitution of intersubjectivity for objectivity as a 
means of legitimating social values requires an entirely different 
process. Rather than attempting to deny subjectivity, one must 
listen to and account for all subjective perspectives. Rather than 
viewing the world as com;tituted by objects, one recognizes oth-
ers' claims to subject status. Methodologically, this calls for con-
versation and discourse between equal subjects, instead of intro-
spection by an individual who plays God. The process therefore 
guards against the tendency of theorists to universalize their per-
spective and, more importantly, the tendency of theory itself to 
assume an all-encompassing stance. An intersubjective process 
implies, in its very method, a certain equality and mutual respect 
between human beings. 86 
C. E Pluribus Unum 
The struggle is not who will or should rule, it is about how we can 
come to a consensus and at the same time allow people the freedom to 
choose their own lives free from current societal restraints. Scales 
believes that we must 
make a choice between adjudicative principles. The choice is not, 
however, between male and female hegemony. The choice is 
rather between a compulsion to control reality and a commitment 
to restrain hegemony. Do we want a system that brooks no dis-
agreement or one that invites as many points of view as the vari-
eties of existence require?87 
84. !d. at 89 (footnote omitted). 
85. !d. at 63. 
86. !d. at 59, n.39. 
87. Scales, supra note 2, at 1385-86 (footnotes omitted). 
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"We must look beyond the familiar and look instead to the unfamil-
iar -we must gain a consciousness of that which is not necessarily of our 
own traditional view, but of the view of others. By so doing we may al-
low ourselves to be liberated from our self-imposed oppression and allow 
ourselves possible solutions. "8g 
The feminist approach takes justification seriously; it is a more 
honest and efficient way to achieve legitimacy. The feminist le-
gal standard for equality is altogether principled in requiring 
commitment to finding the moral crux of matters before the 
court. The feminist approach will tax us. We will be exhausted 
by bringing feminist method to bear. Yet we must force law mak-
ers and interpreters to hear that which they have been well 
trained to ignore. We will have to divest ourselves of our learned 
reticence, debrief ourselves every day. We will have to trust our-
selves to be able to describe life to each other-in our courts, in 
our legislatures, in our emergence together. 89 
To practice feminism is harder than it seems; we must look at a variety of 
viewpoints and not focus exclusively on our own, we must strive to do 
justice while being fair, supporting law, and caring for those affected by 
our decisions. "[I]f society is in some sense constituted by the world 
views that give meaning to social interaction, then to change conscious-
ness is to change society itself."90 Given the present state of society 
would this be such a bad thing? 
IV. THE TROUBLE WITH FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 
Law, as a whole, is a combination of rules and interpretation of those 
rules, objectivity and subjectivity, rules and standards, logical theory and 
practical application, posited laws and ethical principles. 91 A distinctively 
polemic jurisprudence "should be the last thing that any member of an 
oppressed group-if that is how the modern American woman should be 
described-wants to see dominate legal thought."92 This "feminine" juris-
88. Cole. supra note 3. at 77 (citation.' omitted). 
89. Scales, supra note 2. at 1403. 
90. David Trubek. Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. 
L. REV. 575, 592 (1984). 
91. See Richard Posner, Conservative Feminism, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191, 212 (1989). 
92. /d. Judge Posner goes on to explain that those who reject formalism are not feminist 
jurisprudists simply because they have rejected the formalistic aspects of the law. Rather, they "are 
legal realists, or pragmatists, or instrumentalists, or skeptics-which is to say that they possess 
outlooks on law that long predate the entry of women in significant numbers into positions of 
influence in the legal profession." /d. at 213. 
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prudence, with its ethic of care (as opposed to an ethic of rights), is one in 
which discretion and individual circumstances take the fore in a judicial 
decision. But a purely discretionary system, lacking formality of any 
kind, is at its extreme, a "people's court" typified by mobocracy and 
vigilantism, with the minority group standing atop the gallows, such as in 
the appeal-less, judge-jury-and-executioner Klan courts in the pre-civil 
rights South. 93 
A. Is It Feminist at All? 
Leslie Bender, a prominent legal feminist and law professor, made 
this interesting observation: 
Each year that I teach torts I watch again as a majority of my stu-
dents initially find [the] legal "no duty" rule reprehensible. After 
the rationale is explained and the students become immersed in 
the "reasoned" analysis, and after they take a distanced, objective 
posture informed by liberalism's concerns for autonomy and lib-
erty, many come to accept the legal rule that intuitively had 
seemed so wrong to them. They are taught to reject their emo-
tions, instincts, and ethics, and to view accidents and tragedies 
abstractly, removed from their social and particularized contexts, 
and to apply instead rationally-derived universal principles and a 
vision of human nature as atomistic, and as free from constraint 
as possible. They are also taught that there are legally relevant 
distinctions between acts and omissions. . . . How would this 
drowning-stranger hypothetical look from a new legal perspec-
tive informed by a feminist ethic based upon notions of caring, 
responsibility, interconnectedness, and cooperation?94 
How, indeed. Bender's analysis of her students' response presents an 
interesting problem with the idea of a feminine jurisprudence. If Bender 
is speaking about the general response of her students, and that response 
was uniform among most of her students, then one can hardly look at the 
ethic of care-at least as it is described by Bender-and see an ethic that 
is purely feminine in nature. Instead of feminine, perhaps, the proper term 
should be humanist. 95 The idea of the humanist or caring sort of law, one 
93. Admittedly, such an extreme discretionary system could also lead to tyranny by the 
vocal minority, just as today more money is channeled to AIDS research than to cancer research 
though arguably more members of society are affected by cancer than by AIDS. 
94. Bender, supra note 34, at 33-34. 
95. Although the "no duty" rule may not be illustrative of all legal principles, one would 
nevertheless expect that such a response would be uniform. The authors, both law students, one 
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that is not so rule-bound as to deprive the court of any latitude for mercy 
or contemplation of individual circumstances, is the sort of law at the 
heart of feminine jurisprudence. But is it not also so in formalistic or tra-
ditionallaw? What Bender would term an "ethic of care" could easily be 
referred to as "policy," "mercy," or the "discretion" of the court. Perhaps 
the question is not "whether there is a distinctively feminine outlook on 
law, as distinct from an outlook that men and women share," but whether 
the outlook that both genders share is displayed by both genders in their 
actions, "though perhaps in different proportions."96 
B. The Penalty for Breaching the Ethic of Care 
Consider, for example, another tort case-a simple automobile acci-
dent, in which a common, everyday tortfeasor, while speeding through 
town, smashes into a victim who is exercising her pedestrian right of way 
in a crosswalk. The collision crushes the victim and leaves her without 
the use of her arms or legs. Of course the tortfeasor will be held legally 
responsible for the harm caused, and the court will make the tortfeasor 
pay. But is justice then entirely done? Money damages could hardly be 
said to be adequate compensation for the loss of one's limbs, nor are 
money damages sufficient to compensate the suffering the victim's family 
will certainly face. Perhaps, then, the driver may satisfy justice by serving 
time in prison. A justice of care might find that the driver's having to deal 
with the emotional results of having deprived someone of the use of her 
limbs and her livelihood is all the prison the driver needs, and would be 
the most effective way to increase the driver's caution in the future. To 
expect that kind of grief or emotional reaction for such an act in today's 
society, however, is asking much. Without remorse, there is no catalyst 
for change. 
Bender maintains that no matter how much money is paid, or penance 
done, there is still a great deal of care-giving that will have to be done hy 
the victim's family, friends, or others. This care-giving is not necessarily 
deemed to be the responsibility of the tortfeasor. The ethic of care would 
require payment for that care-giving as well--even to the extent of having 
male and one female, had exactly the response to the "no duty"' rule that Professor Bender 
describes among her own students. But because Bender uses that response to demonstrate a 
"feminine" response, and at least a conscious subjection of the feminine carmg response through 
"reasoned analysis ... [and] a distanced, objective posture," which is conunonly associated with 
"male" legal jurisprudence, and because this response is not peculiarly female, it is somewhat 
difficult to term the "ethic of care" a uniquely "female" jurisprudential theory-especially since, 
as Professor Bender and the authors' own experience demonstrate, the "intuitive" ethic of care 
which is offended by rules rooted in "rationally-derived" principles such as the "no duty" rule is 
not always a response unique to women. 
96. Posner, supra note 91, at 213. 
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the tortfeasor give that care personally.97 Bender concludes that "[t]his 
seemingly minor change would transform the core of negligence law to a 
human, responsive system. "98 
The idea is a nice one, but care-giving work, or the act of nurturing 
and bringing the victim of a tort back to health or well-being, is not al-
ways (or is rarely) a quantifiable effort. Additionally, to make the tortfea-
sor continue to perform care giving in response to the harm caused would 
be to inflict a penalty, rather than to exact compensation. Certainly the 
family or friends of the victim have to continue to cope in many instances 
with the continuing effects of a tort, but to cause the tortfeasor to be be-
holden to the victim for the rest of his life is, in no uncertain terms, pun-
ishment. Why do we punish people? If we cause the injurer to pay or to 
provide care personally for the rest of the victim's life, we must ask, 
"Why?" Do we hope to dissuade similar actions by others in the future? 
Is it to exact some sort of retribution from the injurer? Or, would we in-
met such a sentence upon the injurer because of some sort of reformative 
prospect-some aspiration that by imposing the punishment on the injur-
er somehow we can teach him or her to exercise an ethic of care to some 
greater degree.99 Finally, to place this kind of burden-this sen-
tence-upon the injurer is to effectually do away with the criminal justice 
system. If we are to inflict this kind of punishment upon people for their 
failure to act in accord with a particular ethic of care, then perhaps we 
ought to do away with the civil justice system altogether in favor of a 
purely criminal one. 
C. The Caring Neighbor Standard 
Some feminist legal scholars woulrl replace the "reasonable person" 
standard with the "caring neighbor" standard. 10° Critics of the "caring" 
standard, however, point out that in determining the standard of care we 
must keep in mind that most neighbors are not caring, and most accident 
97. See Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, 
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 905. 
98. Bender, supra note 34, at 36. 
99. What is it that we hope to accomplish? Do we desire punishment, restitution, deterrence, 
or something else? Each theory for why we punish has its own advocates. For example, every 
parent has his or her own notions of the proper way to discipline a child for spilling milk. Some 
parents take the retributive approach and discipline by spanking-hoping for deterrence of future 
carelessness. Others take the reformative approach and discipline their children by making the child 
clean up the milk and learn the consequences of his or her actions. Which approach do we take 
as a society so as to teach a greater ethic of care? That, too, depends upon each indi vidnal' s 
experience with each respective system of "justice." 
100. See Bender, supra note 96, at 905. 
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victims are not neighbors. 101 Indeed, to hold a person potentially liable for 
not acting as a caring neighbor will not have a persuasive effect upon 
people in general to act with greater care in their dealings and 
interactions with other people. 102 Judge Posner addresses Bender's pro-
posed transformation of the law into a "human, responsive system" thus: 
The only effect of adopting Bender's proposal [to replace the 
reasonable standard with the caring standard] would be to shift 
negligence liability in the direction of strict liability. Her "caring 
neighbor" is an unnecessary step in the analysis. She might as 
well argue directly for strict liability on the ground that it is the 
more altruistic regime than negligence. 103 
But strict liability is extremely rule-based, and less concerned with the 
particulars of a case than perhaps the feminine ethic of care would 
be-and those characteristics of ruleness and cold universality immedi-
ately bring to mind the "masculine" ethic of rights rather than the ethic of 
care. 104 So in some ways the Bender model is more feminine, or care-
based. But in other ways it is distinctively masculine in its formality. 
101. See Posner, supra note 91, at 214. 
102. Judge Posner illustrates this principle with a hypothetical: 
[S]uppose an accident having expected cost of $100 could be prevented only by 
an expenditure of $110 on care. Then the failure to prevent the accident would 
not be negligent, and . . . the injurer would not be liable to his victim. But 
presumably a caring neighbor would go the extra step to prevent the accident ... 
so under Bender's proposal the injurer would be liable if he failed to prevent the 
accident. But liability would not (except in special circumstances) induce him to 
take the extra care, which by definition would cost more than the expected 
accident; he would rather pay the expected judgement. Liability in such a case 
would just make negligence liability strict liability. 
/d. at 214, n. 43. It is also important to keep in mind that Judge Posner focuses on the economic 
(and perhaps realist) theory of law. Again, the injurer may feel remorse for his wrong, and his 
conscience may move him to spend the extra $10 on care rather than hit someone with his car and 
for the rest of his life have to deal with the knowledge that he had seriously injured someone. 
Speaking somewhat cynically, though realistically, those persons willing to spend the extra $10 are 
fewer and fewer. In growing proportions of today's society, the cost of remorse is substantially 
greater than $1 0. 
103. /d. at 214. 
104. /d. Judge Posner explains the seeming irony thus: 
Strict liability is sometimes defended on the ground that it provides more 
compensation to more accident victims. This is a partial analysis. Strict liability 
can also result in higher prices, and the burden may be borne by consumers. The 
net distributive impact is unclear. If these complications are ignored, maybe a 
feminine outlook on law could be expected to stress compensation. 
/d. Arguably, however, where automobile-pedestrian accidents occur, and inasmuch as there are 
pedestrians who jaywalk and drivers who do not speed, there are cases in which the driver is not 
necessarily negligent. 
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D. The Source of the Feminine Voice 
In listening to this feminine voice, one wonders from whence the 
voice derives its distinctive tonal qualities. While there are those who 
would argue that such a voice is inherent in all women, others argue that 
the feminine voice, with its tonal qualities of care and responsibility, is 
simply a reflection of values that have arisen from women's subordina-
tion by men, and is a voice full of the virtues and characteristics that 
women have developed over the ages in response to millennia of victim-
ization.105 So, in actuality, the feminine voice is, in its purest form, just as 
deep and resonant as the male voice; only after centuries of care-giving, 
subordination, and socialization, has that voice evolved to the pitch of 
care-giving and responsibility that is today associated with woman-ness. 
To listen to this feminine voice, then, would be to compound the effects 
of age-old male domination and reaffirm the male-induced (and male-sup-
ported) roles adopted by women. More and more women are reexamining 
their traditional roles and changing the timbre of their voices to express 
their awareness of societal expectations. Over time the many feminine 
voices have distinguished their individual parts, and thus have enriched 
humanity's song. 
E. The Propriety of the Ethic ofCarefor Legal Reform 
But even if the ethic of care does not have its roots in feminine his-
tory, what makes it a proper model for legal reform? Is this breakdown of 
men and women's voices anything but purely arbitrary and artificially 
created labeling? Why must the division be made down gender lines? 
Why may it not be drawn down hair-color lines, shoe-size lines, or some 
other physical characteristic? The fact that males have dominated a par-
ticular field, while an important consideration, is not conclusive evidence 
that the overwhelming male-ness of that field is what in fact defines the 
nature of that field. 
If the ethic of care is not founded in the history of oppression of 
women, but instead finds its source in the purely feminine experience of 
motherhood and nurturing, what indicates that that experience is applica-
ble or germane to governing and regulating relationships between other 
persons is that everyone needs nurturing to some degree. Children die for 
lack of nurturing. Even though the idea of an ethic of care is based on a 
set of principles of morality that are meant to extend beyond a "domain of 
special relationships,"106 that set of principles cannot be said to be uni-
105. See Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171, 1196-1202 (1992). 
106. Gn..LIGAN, supra note 11, at 73. 
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form across the spectrum of diverse social, economic, and cultural threa-
ds that create the fabric of American society. Still, it cannot be denied 
that when and where caring exists, both the care-giver and the care-recipi-
ent benefit. But there is danger in caregiving. One such danger of 
caregiving is described thus: 
[T]he literature about mothering and caring acknowledges that 
mothers and care givers are not immune from the danger of pro-
jecting one's own perspective onto the other when assessing the 
other's needs and interests and that, in fact, caring sometimes 
involves using one's own judgement about the other's needs, 
even when doing so conflicts with the other's perspective. 107 
Relationships upon which those principles would be based differ not 
only among cultures, but, as the feminist voice theory itself asserts, be-
tween genders. There is little to indicate that the experience of mother-
hood and the experience of nursing children would be any more effica-
cious in the efficient and equitable distribution of justice than is the cur-
rent formalistic "masculine" model. 108 "But the polarity between empa-
thetic, equitable, discretionary, situation-specific justice, on the one hand, 
and the 'rule of law' virtues of neutrality and 'ruleness,' on the other, is 
far older than feminist jurisprudence."109 It is highly improbable that an 
implementation of a feminine ethic of care could take place without radi-
cal transformation of the legal system-something that is unlikely as long 
as the legal profession is male dominated. 110 Just how would women in 
general be affected by a transformation to a legal system based more on 
judicial discretion and contextualism? Judge Posner speculates: "It is 
hard to say whether women would be on balance better or worse off if the 
legal system were more empathetic than it is, but it does not appear that 
women fare particularly well under the discretionary system of qadi jus-
tice in traditional Moslem law."111 
107. McClain, supra note 105, at 1202. 
108. ld. at 1196-1202. McClain points to recent feminist empirical work on care which 
"argues that care giving is 'not an appropriate model for all social relationships,' since it 'fosters 
exclusivity and privatism rather than a sense of collective responsibility.'" ld. (quoting Emily K. 
Abel & Margaret K. Nelson, Circles of Care: An Introductory Essay, in CIRCLES OF CARE, 4, 7 
(Emily K. Abel & Margaret K. Nelson, eds., 1990)). 
109. Posner, supra note 91, at 217. 
110. See McClain, supra note 105, at 1196-1202. 
111. Posner, supra note 91, at 212. 
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F. The Coercive Element 
The legal system as it operates today is generally concerned with ob-
jective standards rather than with subjective interpretations of conduct. 
"Coercion of caring activity where a caring attitude is absent might sat-
isfy a legalistic duty of care but such 'caring' might lack moral worth."m 
The law cannot compel a person to exercise a "caring" attitude any more 
than it can compel any other kind of feeling within a human being. A 
court cannot compel a person to feel pity, remorse, or compassion. A 
court cannot compel a person to feel joy for another party in a lawsuit---
or for anyone for that matter. Certainly in highly particular circumstances 
the court may impose its ruling as to the morality or ethical nature of a 
particular act. Courts of inquiry in cases of violations of the attorney's 
professional code of ethics, for instance, are example...;; in which the court 
may exercise legal coercion. But such coercion is upon a member of a 
profession. The primary means of motivation for ethical conduct in soci-
ety is a desire to do what is best for society and the community as a whol-
e. Gilligan's ethic of care would apply to all of humanity rather than sim-
ply between specific individuals, and there remains "a fundamental ques-
tion whether such an ethic (or duty) [as the ethic of care] is an appropri-
ate subject for legal coercion, as opposed to personal and communal aspi-
ration."113 Coercion is neither practical nor likely, but caring can be a 
goal for more people as they are influenced by caring others. 
G. The Problematic Catch-all Model for the Ethic of Care 
Whose ethic of care ought we apply? If we are to look to a "caring 
neighbor" standard, which neighbor ought we choose? Some critics have 
pointed out that to choose one model of what that ethic of care ought to 
be might "invite state censure or control of actual women who fail to live 
up to or whose experience is not ret1ected in such idealized standards."114 
A model based on some arbitrarily delineated ethical ideal ca1mot recog-
nize the vast racial, social, and economic differences among people in 
general. For instance, it would be next to impossible to reach a consensus 
from five women115 representing five different religious, marital, and eco-
nomic backgrounds as to what a proper "ethic" of care ought to include, 
inasmuch as each person's idea of "caring" may be different. In an ideal 
situation, the legal system would be much more empathetic to all minor-
112. McClain, supra note 105, at 1201. 
113. /d. 
114. /d. at 1202. 
115. The hypothetical could just a.~ easily include men, but for the sake of simplicity in 
determining the "feminine voice," the sampling includes only women-as "authorities" on the 
feminine voice. 
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ity groups. But "[s]uch models, if they are to be used, need to recognize 
the real constraints on women's lives due to poverty, lack of health care, 
abusive relationships, and the like that contribute to some mothers' feel-
ings of powerlessness to meet some middle-class ideal of care. "116 
Nonetheless, these are the reasons why we need to explore an "ethic 
of care." Such an ethic attempts to account for real, personal situations 
and is far more pragmatic than abstract ideals of "justice." It does, in fact, 
exist in some forms in today's justice system. No contract will be found 
unconscionable where the court does not look at the respective bargaining 
power of the parties. Such an approach could be expanded. Each case 
decided in court might thus make the rule of law to fit each particular sit-
uation rather than make each particular situation fit a particular rule of 
law. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
As we have discussed, while feminism might not be the perfect juris-
prudential theory, neither are traditional theories satisfactory for dealing 
with the practical realities of our world. 
Feminists have always been willing to challenge the status quo in 
their search for expanded rights and a better life for all. We ought to fear 
the day when society becomes complacent enough to stand idly by as 
American jurisprudence takes its own course. Justice is part of govern-
ment, and ours is a government for the people and by the people. By ex-
panding the definition of "equality," feminists hope to thereby expand 
access to both justice and feelings of connection to society-access and 
connection of all people by all people. 
Feminism is more pragmatic than some of its brother theories. 
Women have grown accustomed to playing by male rules on the 
playground. "Feminist jurisprudence cannot afford to rest in idealism or 
despair, for women who recognize their unequal treatment cannot afford 
to accept it. Because feminist theory and theorists are grounded in the 
material reality of gender, their theory is immediately connected to hu-
man relations. "117 
As we wrote at the beginning of our paper, we seek cooperation be-
tween men and women to form a more perfect combination of perspec-
tives and roles. We do not seek to make women of men or men of wome-
n. 118 After all, gender is gender, and rather than merge the two into one 
116. McClain, supra note 105, at 1202. 
117. Cole, supra note 3, at 86. 
118. We look again to Gilligan for a simple and insightful observation. Gilligan points to the 
very beginning, "to A,dam and Eve--a story which shows, among other things, that if you make 
a woman out of a man, you are bound to get into trouble." GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 6. 
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homogenous and androgynous form, we ought to revel in and explore the 
possibilities that come from our differences. For many, such a renovation 
of the judicial system would involve compromise and change; but as Cole 
writes, "[t]he road to social change may in fact be circular: it begins with 
mutual respect and ends with the conditions that might make mutual re-
spect possible."119 No matter how we characterize it or where we begin, 
we must strive for mutuality of respect and individual sovereignty in de-
termining the direction of our lives. 
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